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1 Introduction
In most countries with mixed health care systems it is common practice for physicians to
work simultaneously in public hospitals and private facilities. Despite the need for better
documented evidence, existing data show that this phenomenon is widespread in many
developed and developing countries. In Europe, for instance, physicians working in the
public sector often operate in private facilitates under their public contracts. Important
examples are Austria, where almost 100% of the senior specialist hospital doctors work
in both sectors, Ireland, where more than 90% of the doctors employed in state hospitals
also have private practice privileges, and the UK, where 60% of public doctors also work
for the private sector. Outside Europe, there is available data for Australia and New
Zealand, where 79% and 43% of public sector doctors, respectively, hold some job in the
private sector. In developing countries, low public-sector salaries are making exclusively
state-employed doctors disappear and, thus, dual practice is prevalent in African coun-
tries (Egypt, Mozambique, Zambia, among others), Asian countries (Cambodia, India,
Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.), Latin America, and also in Eastern Europe.1
Despite the prevalence of dual practice among doctors in the majority of mixed health
systems, there is a surprising lack of evidence regarding the potential impact on the
eﬃciency of health care resource management. Most health economists agree that this
dual practice has both positive and negative side-eﬀects on the delivery of health services.
They argue that, on the one hand, allowing dual practice can serve to reduce waiting
times for treatment and lead to improvements in access to health services. But, on the
other hand, dual providers may have incentives to skimp on work hours or divert patients
to private clinics where they have some financial interest, compromising the eﬃciency and
quality of public health provision. On the whole, dual practice among doctors is subject
to social controversy, as there is no consensus on its net eﬀects and there is no unique and
simple answer as to whether and how this practice should be regulated.2
This lack of consensus is reflected by the fact that there is wide cross-country het-
erogeneity in government responses to dual practice.3 While some governments ban it
altogether,4 others regulate or restrict dual practice with diﬀerent regulatory instruments.
The measures implemented include oﬀering higher salaries or other work benefits to physi-
1See Ferrinho et al. (2004) for further discussion on the available evidence of dual practice in developing
countries, and the recent work by García-Prado and González (2011) for a review on the extent of dual
practice in the health sector.
2See Eggleston and Bir (2006) and Socha and Bech (2011) for a thorough discussion on these issues.
3See García-Prado and González (2007) for a review of these policies.
4China (Jingqing, 2006) and Canada (Flood and Archibaldare, 2001) are examples of countries where
physician dual practice is forbidden.
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cians in exchange for their working exclusively in the public sector,5 limiting the income
physicians can earn through dual practice,6 and limiting dual practice through govern-
ment specification of the maximum involvement in private activities.7 In addition, most
of these regulations have been introduced only in developed countries, while in develop-
ing countries dual practice remains largely unregulated, although it is attracting more
attention from policy makers.
In this paper we provide a theoretical model to study diﬀerent governmental responses
to dual practice. The aim of the paper is two-fold. First, we analyze from a theoretical
point of view diﬀerent regulations that are currently employed to deal with dual practice.
Secondly, we investigate whether the regulatory policies that are optimal for developed
countries are adequate for developing countries as well, or whether a diﬀerent policy mix
is needed. As discussed below, there are no existing works in the literature that provide
a uniform theoretical framework to evaluate the desirability of one or another regulation
on dual practice. We believe our results shed new light on these questions.
We construct a simple model in which a Health Authority contracts physicians in order
to provide public health care and designs the regulatory regime regarding dual practice.
Physicians have diﬀerent levels of ability, interpreted as their capacity to provide adequate
health services to patients, and they can choose, given the regulatory regime and available
contracts, whether to work solely for the public sector, as dual practitioners, or exclusively
in the private sector. In our model the public/private interaction is two-fold. On the one
hand, private practice might aﬀect the performance of a physician in the public sector.
On the other hand, if the private market recognizes and rewards ability it becomes costly
for the Health Authority to retain highly skilled physicians within the public sector.
5The governments of Spain, Portugal and Italy, among others, have oﬀered public physicians exclusive
contracts that aim to ensure that signatories do not engage in private practice in exchange for salary
supplementation or promotions.
6The restriction of private earnings of publicly employed physicians has been implemented in the UK
and in France. In the UK, full-time NHS consultants, who are mostly senior specialists, are permitted to
earn up to 10% of their gross income from private practice in addition to their NHS earnings. Those NHS
doctors who work under a maximum part-time contract are allowed to practice privately without earning
restrictions by giving up one eleventh of their NHS salary (European Observatory on Health Systems,
2004). Similarly, in France, public hospitals employ both full-time and part-time physicians who can
also provide private services subject to the restriction that income from private fees is limited to 30% of
physician total income (Rickman and McGuire, 1999).
7In Austria, Ireland and Italy physicians are encouraged to perform private services within government
hospitals and the share of beds allocated to privately insured patients is legally defined. In Austria the
share of beds allocated to privately insured patients must not exceed 25% of total beds (Stepan and
Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2005). In Italy public hospitals are required to reserve between 6% and 12%
of their beds for private patients (France, Taroni and Donatini, 2005). Similarly, in Ireland, 20% of beds
in publicly funded hospitals are designated for private patients (Wiley, 2005).
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We analyze regulations that deal with dual practice using two diﬀerent health produc-
tion functions in the public sector so as to illustrate various situations in diﬀerent coun-
tries. First, we consider an environment where the production of health within the public
sector depends mostly on the overall number of public physicians and not so much on
their individual characteristics. We identify this situation with developed countries where
the availability of advanced medical technology, existence of standardized treatment pro-
tocols and adherence to practice guidelines substantially reduces physician discretion. We
also consider a health production function for which the personal characteristics of each
physician play an important role in the provision of health care, a scenario that we believe
more closely resembles what happens in less developed economies.
We focus on three kinds of interventions: banning dual practice, oﬀering rewarding
contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice, including both earnings limita-
tions and limits to involvement in private activities.
Our model yields some interesting implications concerning regulation. First, if a policy
of limiting dual practice is to be enforced, limiting physicians’ earnings from dual practice
is always worse than limiting their involvement. The reason is that a policy that constrains
private income has a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual practice performed, and therefore
on its associated costs, as it only aﬀects highly skilled physicians who must reduce private
activities in order to satisfy their earning constraint. In contrast, a policy that limits
involvement in private activities directly targets the intensity of dual practice and is
therefore more eﬀective in curbing losses in productivity.
While the above recommendation is general, our analysis suggests that in many re-
spects optimal policies diﬀer for developed and less developed economies. In developed
countries the choice of regulatory intervention depends solely on the cost of the dual
practice. For small costs no intervention is required, while for large costs the best in-
tervention is to impose a limit on physician involvement in dual practice. Interestingly,
we find that banning dual practice, even if it is enforceable, is never desirable. Even if
dual practice imposes a significant burden on the public production of health, the Health
Authority can alleviate these costs as dual practice reduces the salary needed to retain
doctors working at public facilities. Finally, oﬀering exclusive contracts to physicians who
volunteer to work exclusively in the public sector is optimal only if a limiting policy faces
enforceability problems.
In developing countries the results diﬀer sharply, as it is the attractiveness of the
private sector that determines the need for regulation. If the attractiveness of the private
sector is high, then the government should never intervene, regardless of the cost of dual
practice. In this case, restricting dual practice pushes highly skilled physicians into the
private sector, and the Health Authority of a developing country cannot aﬀord to lose
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its most able professionals. When the private sector is unattractive, however, the risk of
losing physicians is low, and the best policy is either to limit dual practice (if the cost
associated with dual practice is low) or to ban it (if the cost is high). Limiting policies in
developing countries always emerge as the optimal instrument in situations in which the
private sector is moderately attractive, i.e. not so low as to make banning feasible, and
not so high as to draw a significant number of physicians away from the public sector.
Exclusive contracts are never optimal in developing countries. The reason is that the
physicians who accept the premium and become public-only providers tend to be the
less productive. Given the importance that doctors’ individual characteristics have for
the production of public health in developing countries, paying such a premium is not
worthwhile.
The theoretical literature on physician dual practice in mixed health care markets is
not abundant and relatively recent.8 There has been some research on physicians’ incen-
tives as dual providers. Rickman and McGuire (1999) concentrate on the implications of
the fact that a doctor can oﬀer both public and private services to the same patient and
examine the optimal public reimbursement for doctors who are dual providers. Barros
and Olivella (2002) and González (2005) analyze the physician’s decision to “cream-skim”
patients in a context with waiting lists in the public sector. While González (2005) shows
that if doctors are dual providers, the most profitable patients will be referred to their
private practices, Barros and Olivella (2002) find that if public treatment is rationed it
is not necessarily the case that physicians end up treating the mildest cases from the
waiting list in their private practice. Finally, Delfgaauw (2007) considers the implications
of diﬀerences in physician altruism. He shows that allowing for private provision of health
care in parallel to public provision is generally beneficial for patients, but allowing physi-
cians to transfer patients from the public system to their private practices reduces these
benefits, as it harms the poorest patients.
There are very few works that focus on the regulations that deal with dual practice.
González (2004) presents a model in which a physician has an incentive to provide ex-
cessive quality in the public sector in order to raise prestige. In such a context, limiting
private practice might not be desirable. She also shows that the use of exclusive contracts
can be a valuable regulatory measure when governments cannot design appropriate incen-
8There are other papers in the health economics literature that have examined the interaction between
public and private health care provision, but they do not consider job incentives of physicians working
in both sectors. These include Barros and Martínez-Giralt (2002), which analyzes the eﬀect of diﬀerent
reimbursement rules on quality and cost eﬃciency; Iversen (1997), which considers the eﬀect of private
health care provision on waiting lists in the public sector; Jofre-Bonet (2000), which studies the interaction
between public and private providers when consumers diﬀer in income; and Marchand and Schroyen
(2005), which analyzes the desirability of mixed health care systems when distributional aspects matter.
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tive contracts. Biglaiser and Ma (2007) also study the incentives of moonlighting, which
can lead public-service physicians to refer their patients to their private practices. Using a
model where some doctors are dedicated to the public system and behave honestly while
others are utility maximizers, they show that limiting private practice revenues through
price ceilings reduces the adverse behavioral reactions of public sector physicians and can
improve public service quality. Finally, using a model in which physicians divide their
labour between public and (if allowed) private sectors, Brekke and Sørgard (2007) suggest
that allowing physician dual practice ‘crowds out’ public provision, and results in lower
overall health care provision. Thus, a ban on dual practice can be an eﬃcient policy when
private sector competition is weak and public and private provisions are suﬃciently close
substitutes. All these papers analyze specific policies in diﬀerent settings. Therefore, to
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that provides a uniform theoretical frame-
work through which the desirability of diﬀerent regulations that deal with dual practice
can be determined and compared.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 intro-
duces two simple regimes: a laissez-faire scenario where dual practice is allowed without
regulation, and the opposite extreme, where dual practice is forbidden. Section 4 con-
centrates on rewarding policies for physicians that work for the public sector exclusively,
while Section 5 analyzes limiting policies. Section 6 characterizes the optimal policy mix
for the regulation of dual practice and elaborates on the main policy implications of the
preceding analysis. Finally, the last section oﬀers some concluding remarks. All of the
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two sets of agents involved in the model: a set of physicians and the regulator or
Health Authority (HA hereafter). The HA aims to provide public health care but is also
concerned about its costs. The quality (or the level) of publicly provided care depends on
which physicians work in the public system and on whether these physicians are involved
in dual practice or not. We assume that the HA designs the rules for performing dual
practice and, given the basic regime (dual practice allowed or not), the physicians choose
among the diﬀerent options available to them. Accordingly our model has two stages,
and we solve the game by backwards induction.
Let us now detail for each of the players their objective functions, decision variables
and all the parameters that are relevant in the model.
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2.1 The Physicians
Physicians have diﬀerent abilities a distributed uniformly on the interval [0, a¯].9 The total
amount of physicians has mass a¯. Physicians can work solely in the public sector, work
for the private sector or work in both sectors as dual providers. If they work for the public
sector they receive a net wage w, in exchange for a fixed working time (that we denote
by g, g > 0). To keep the model tractable we rule out the possibility that a physician can
decide the extent of his working time in the public sector, g. In other words, we disregard
the possibility that a physician chooses to work part-time at public facilities. If physicians
work in the private sector (either as dual providers, D, or as exclusively private physicians,
Pv) the profits they obtain Π are the revenues from the patients treated, net of the costs.
Physicians’ private revenues depend on the private market price per consultation (p, p ≥ 0)
and the number of patients treated. We assume that the number of patients treated in
private practice follows a Cobb-Douglas type production function, 2h
√
aγ, that depends
on the ability of the physician, a, and his level of involvement (for instance, working
hours) in private practice (γ, γ ≥ 0), as well as on a total factor productivity 2h (with
h > 0).10 The cost of working in the private sector depends on the level of involvement
in private activities and on whether physicians work also or not within the public sector
(G ∈ {g, 0}). The cost function is given by C(γ,G) = cGγ,11 where:
cG =
(
2 if G = g
1 if G = 0.
Consequently, profits from private practice have the following form:12
Π (a, γ,G) ≡ p2h√aγ − cGγ. (1)
9Note that denoting the lowest ability by a = 0 is only a normalization. In our model, all doctors
have been trained and are able to perform as certified physicians.
10The factor of productivity is written as 2h since it simplifies the expression of the derivatives without
loss of generality.
11A more natural modelization would be to introduce a strictly convex cost of working in the private
sector. However, this leads to too complex expressions that prevent us from getting closed results. The
discontinuity in the marginal costs adopted in our model allows us to introduce convexity in the model
without adding more complexity.
12An alternative way of modeling physician private profits is to think of physicians as having a fixed
time budget and deciding the fraction of time to allocate between work and leisure. Consider, for instance,
Π (a, γ,G) ≡ p2h√aγ+εG(T−G−γ), where T is total time available, γ measures again the time allocated
to private practice and εG represents the value the physician allocates to leisure. Under the assumption
that the physician appreciates more leisure when he has less free time (standard decreasing marginal
utility of leisure), this alternative modelization is equivalent to ours. The details are available from the
authors upon request. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility.
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Considering marginal cost c0 = 1 for G = 0 is just a normalization. Assuming cg = 2
when G = g is done in order to simplify the exposition by reducing the number of cases
under study. The essential element is that being involved in private practice is more costly
for those physicians that are also working in the public sector. This reflects the idea that
there is an inherent cost (in terms of eﬀort) associated with dual practice (due, for instance,
to the fact that these extra hours are done in addition to the normal dedication g in the
public sector, the need to commute from one facility to the other, necessity to coordinate
two patient schedules, potentially diﬀerent working protocols, etc.). If we interpreted our
model in terms of time constraints (see footnote 12), the extra cost associated with dual
practice would come from the fact that simultaneously working in the two sectors leaves
physicians less time for leisure.
2.2 The Health Authority
The other agent involved in the model is the HA. To define the Health Authority’s
objective function, we take the view that the HA is only concerned about the level of
heath care provided by the public system. In other words, we assume that the HA does
not include the private provision of health in its objective function.13 We assume that
the performance of a physician in the public sector depends on his ability and is given by
the function F (a) . If the physician is a dual supplier, however, this has an impact on his
public sector performance. Formally, a dual provider’s performance in the public sector
is given by 1
1+δγF (a) , where δ measures the marginal impact of the private activity on
public sector performance. Note that this functional form allows for several situations. If
δ = 0 public and private activities are independent, and dual practice does not aﬀect the
performance of the physician in the public sector. A loss associated with dual practice
(related, for instance, to the fact that physicians divert time and attention from hard-to-
control tasks, or to the emergence of conflicts of interest such as induced demand, etc.) is
represented by positive values of δ. This functional form also accommodates situations in
which complementarities exist between the two sectors, corresponding to a negative δ. In
what follows, however, our discussion will concentrate on δ > 0, since we are interested in
analyzing situations where the regulator is concerned about the negative implications of
doctors’ involvement in dual practice.14 Note that if δ > 0 a dual provider’s performance
13This assumption reflects that the performance of private health providers is out of the scope of
intervention of the HA. This can be sustained on the grounds that the HA is an agency of the government
whose mandate is to guarantee an adequate performance of the public health sector. In this line, one
can argue that ensuring an eﬃcient provision of public health services is part of the government policy
agenda and voters will evaluate the attainment of this goal.
14We will briefly discuss the results when δ < 0 in the next section, to illustrate why this case is not of
particular interest for our analysis.
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in the public sector is decreasing and convex in γ.
Let us define as pub ⊂ [0, a¯] the set of all doctors working exclusively for the public
sector, and as D ⊂ [0, a¯] the set of all doctors involved in dual practice. We denote by
|pub| and |D| the size (number of physicians) of the sets pub and D respectively. Then,
we write the HA’s objective function as:
max
w
W =
Z
a∈pub
F (a) da+
Z
a∈D
1
1 + δγ
F (a) da− (1 + λ)w(|pub|+ |D|).
The first term measures the health provided at public facilities. The last term repre-
sents the wage costs: how many physicians work (exclusively or partially) in the public
sector times the salary. The parameter λ reflects the marginal cost of public funds, and can
be conceived as the relative importance that costs have as compared to health revenues.
The HA decides on the wage w, which indirectly determines the physician’s decision
to allocate services. Assuming that the wage in the public sector is independent of the
physician’s ability is a simplifying assumption trying to capture the idea that physician
payments are more performance related in the private sector than in the public. Moreover,
it accounts for the fact that most countries pay public physicians in the same service
and/or category the same wage. Note that, without loss of generality, we assume that
the HA does not introduce any constraint on the number of physicians that will be hired
in the public sector since when it is interested in reducing participation it is suﬃcient to
reduce the wage, which allows it to save costs.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this model can be used to understand how the
implications of dual practice might diﬀer for developing and more developed countries,
and also to assess how the relative merits of diﬀerent regulations depend on the type of
economy. For this purpose, we consider two alternative technologies F (a) for the pro-
duction of health in the public sector.15 Developed countries benefit from widespread use
of advanced technologies and test-based diagnoses, as well as rigorous training processes,
standardized treatments and protocols, and strict adherence to practice guidelines. More-
over, the large size of public facilities facilitates the referral of patients to specialists and
the formation of teams of physicians who share information and discuss especially diﬃcult
cases. All these features point towards a lower degree of physician discretion and hence
15Although throughout the paper we consider the access to diﬀerent technologies as the identifying
feature of developed and developing countries, we thank an anonymous referee for raising two issues that
are also relevant for our discussion. First, within a given health care system, diﬀerent specialties may have
access to diﬀerent technologies, what would call for a more speciality-specific dual practice regulation.
Second, leaving aside technological aspects, there are other distinguishing features among countries. For
instance, developing countries are often characterized by ineﬃcient fiscal systems and, therefore, by a
higher shadow cost of raising public funds than their developed counterparts. We discuss these (and
other related) issues in Subsection 6.2.
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reduced impact of individual physician characteristics on the quality of care delivered at
public facilities. We model this by assuming a health production technology of the form
F (a) = ϕ. In contrast, in developing countries the lower degree of specialization among
physicians, their obligation to cope with illnesses outside their area of expertise, the lack
of infrastructures and modern technologies that support diagnosis, and the lack of formal-
ized medical protocols all make the actual quality of care more dependent on individual
physician characteristics. For this reason, we consider a health production technology of
the form F (a) = fa.16
In order to simplify the analysis, by avoiding degenerate cases, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 We assume that: (i) a¯ is high enough, i.e., a¯ (1 + λ) k2 ≥ ϕ, and (ii)
f > (1 + λ) k2.
Assumption 1 part (i) guarantees that for the constant public health production func-
tion F (a) = ϕ the upper bound a¯ is suﬃciently large so as to avoid (corner) situations in
which theHA induces no physician to work solely in the private sector. Assumption 1 part
(ii) guarantees that for the health production function F (a) = fa the public productivity
parameter f is large enough so that it always pays to sustain the public sector.
Now we have all the tools to study the impact of diﬀerent policy options to regulate
dual practice. As mentioned in the Introduction, we observe wide variations in how gov-
ernments tackle the issue of dual practice. In the following sections we analyze several
policies currently in force in some health care systems. We, first, consider only the choice
allowing versus prohibiting dual practice. We then study more sophisticated regulations
such as the desirability of allowing dual practice while oﬀering work benefits to physicians
in exchange for their working exclusively in the public sector, limiting the income physi-
cians can earn through dual job holding, and limiting the degree of involvement of public
physicians in private activities.
3 Laissez-faire versus Banning
The first possible policy option is to ban dual practice altogether. This scenario might
represent a situation where the HA cannot use sophisticated regulations and is restricted
to using simple all-or-nothing instruments.
16Similar arguments often appear when comparing urban and rural practitioners. For instance, Ra-
binowitz and Paynter (2002) higlights that rural physicians retain more clinical independence in their
practice and, at the same time, they may experience professional isolation, with less access to colleagues
and medical resources.
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Using backwards induction, we study first the physician’s decision. The physician
makes two choices: where he will work and the time, if any, he will devote to private prac-
tice. Notice that the term ph appears together in (1). Hence, to simplify the presentation,
in what follows we will use the notation k ≡ ph and we will refer to k as a measure of
the relative profitability (attractiveness) of the private sector. We will also label with the
superscript Pb a physician who works in exclusivity for the public health service, with D
a dual practitioner, and with Pv a physician working only in private practice.
A physician who practices solely in the private sector chooses the intensity of his
private practice γPv in order to maximize his profits. Analogously, in cases where the HA
does not impose any restriction, a dual provider chooses his optimal level of involvement
in private practice γD. Maximizing
Π (a, γ,G) ≡ 2k√aγ − cGγ,
it is straightforward to compute that the optimal involvement in private practice for a dual
provider and an only-private provider are γD (a) = k
2a
4
and γPv (a) = k2a, respectively.
The optimal dedication, in turn, yields the following profits from private practice
ΠD
µ
γD (a) =
k2a
4
¶
=
k2a
2
and ΠPv = k2a.
From the previous analysis it follows that the physician’s utility, depending on the type
of practice, is:
UPb = w
UD = w +ΠD
UPv = k2a.
(2)
We can now characterize the physician’s decision as a function of his ability and the wage
oﬀered in the public sector. This is done by comparing the utilities in (2), taking into
account that ΠD = k
2
2
a, if there is no restriction on dual practice, and ΠD = 0 if dual
practice is forbidden.
Lemma 1 For a given salary w, the optimal decision of a physician, as a function of his
ability a, is as follows:
a) If dual practice is allowed, and
if a ∈
£
0, 2wk2
¤
he chooses dual practice
if a ∈
¡
2w
k2 , a¯
¤
he chooses to work only in the private sector
b) If dual practice is not allowed, and
if a ∈
£
0, wk2
¤
he chooses public practice
if a ∈
¡
w
k2 , a¯
¤
he chooses to work only in the private sector
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Lemma 1 presents the optimal strategy for physicians allocating time to the diﬀerent
types of practice. The more able ones tend to be more involved in the private sector
since their ability allows them to get a higher return. The less able tend to combine both
public and private activities if dual practice is allowed, or work only in public practice
when this is not the case. When dual practice is forbidden, the population of physicians
working for the public sector for a given salary decreases (since, for any w, 2wk2 >
w
k2 ).
In addition, when the public and private sectors do not share physicians, higher private
sector earnings are expected to attract more highly skilled physicians, leaving those of
lesser ability in the public sector.
Thresholds can also be read in terms of physicians with the same ability but a diﬀerent
parameter k. The term k serves as a proxy for the attractiveness of the private sector
for a particular specialitation and, consequently, the higher is k the less physicians will
work solely in the public sector (both if dual practice is allowed and if it is forbidden).
The fact that k is proportional to the price-per-consultation p, which may be considered
as speciality-specific, allows us to discuss the diﬀerent behaviors of physicians engaged
in primary, secondary, and tertiary care, and in diﬀerent specialities. In this regard,
the properties of these thresholds are in accordance with some stylized facts since more
doctors will be involved in the private sector as p increases. For example, Gruen et al.
(2002), using data from a survey in Bangladesh, found that primary-care physicians were
willing to give up dual practice in exchange for a higher salary but doctors engaged in
secondary and tertiary care were far more reluctant to do so. This might reflect the
higher attractiveness of the private sector for more specialized physicians. An alternative
interpretation would relate the parameter k to the financial motivation of the physicians.
In this case, our results suggest that physicians with stronger financial motivations will
be more prone to dual practice either because they suﬀer from financial constraints or
because public sector salaries are low. This is also in accordance with stylized facts that
report that young physicians (whose salary is smaller and often have to pay oﬀ educational
loans) tend to be substantially involved in dual practice. It also accords with the “brain
drain,” i.e. the desire to migrate to countries where physicians’ pay is higher.17
When banning is the only policy available, the HA either lets physicians freely decide
whether and how to be dual providers or forbids dual practice and lets physicians choose
only between public or private provision. Given the physicians behavior, if dual practice
17See, for instance, Mainiero and Woodfield (2008) for an account of the evidence of moonlighting
among radiology residents in the United States, and Mayta-Tristán et al. (2008) for a warning of the risk
of brain drain of physicians in Peru.
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is allowed, the problem that the HA faces to fix the wage in the public sector wLF is
max
w
WLF =
Z 2w
k2
0
F (a)
1 + δ k
2a
4
da− (1 + λ)w2w
k2
. (3)
If there is a ban on dual practice, and assuming that this policy is enforced, the problem
that determines the optimal wage wB is
max
w
WB =
Z w
k2
0
F (a) da− (1 + λ)w w
k2
. (4)
We focus first on the HA’s choice for developed countries.
Proposition 1 In developed economies, if the HA can only ban dual practice, there
exists a δ¯1, with δ¯1 ≈ 5.988(1+λ)ϕ , such that the best intervention is as follows,
i) If δ ≤ δ¯1 not to regulate dual practice and set a wage level
wLF =
q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
.
ii) If δ > δ¯1 ban dual practice and set a wage level
wB =
ϕ
2 (1 + λ)
.
The results in Proposition 1 are predictable and, using Lemma 1, imply (respectively)
the cut-oﬀs
aLF =
2
³q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
´
δk2
and aB =
ϕ
2 (1 + λ) k2
.
From Proposition 1, it is easy to check that for any combination of parameters, wLF < wB.
This implies that dual practice might be desirable because it allows the HA to reduce the
wage needed to retain physicians working in the public sector. This is in agreement with
one of the traditional arguments in the literature in favor of allowing multiple job holdings,
namely that the cost of attracting a worker is smaller when the primary job oﬀers a wage
and the possibility of extra income via dual practice (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991).
However we also have to take into account the potential costs of dual practice, and we
conclude that when this cost is suﬃciently high (δ large), it does not pay to allow dual
practice. Hence, for those specialities where (other things equal) the loss is high the HA
will decide to ban dual practice.
To complete the analysis, we briefly discuss the comparative statics of the results in
Proposition 1. As one might expect, if the HA puts increased weight on public health
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provision (lower λ), or health production technology becomes more eﬃcient (higher ϕ),
then a higher salary will be paid to public physicians and, hence, a larger number of
practitioners will work for the public sector. Conversely, a larger cost of dual practice
(higher δ) results in smaller wages and less physicians hired in the public sector when
dual practice is allowed.
Note that the results presented in Proposition 1 are also valid (and well-defined) for
negative values of δ (as long as −δ < 1+λ
2ϕ ). For δ ≤ 0, the laissez-faire regime is always
superior.18 Since this superiority result is maintained throughout the paper, we will not
discuss it further. The remaining analysis focuses on the case δ > 0.
Let us now turn to the case of developing countries:
Proposition 2 In developing economies, when the HA can only ban dual practice,
there exists a δ¯2(k) such that the best intervention is as follows,
i) If k ∈
³q
f
2(1+λ) ,
q
f
1+λ
i
, irrespective of δ, or if k ≤
q
f
2(1+λ) and δ ≤ δ¯2(k), not to
regulate dual practice and set a wage level
wLF =
2 (f − (1 + λ) k2)
δ (1 + λ) k2
.
ii) If k ≤
q
f
2(1+λ) and δ > δ¯2(k), ban dual practice and set a wage level
wB = a¯k2.
Using Lemma 1, the cut-oﬀs when dual practice is allowed and forbidden are respec-
tively
aLF =
4 (f − (1 + λ) k2)
δ (1 + λ) k4
and aB = a¯.
We see how in developing economies the attractiveness of the private sector (k) plays a
key role. Only when the private sector is relatively unattractive (and on top of that there
is a high value of δ) does the HA find it optimal to ban dual practice. Otherwise the best
it can do is to cope with its negative implications. The reason is that a high k implies
that banning dual practice will encourage physicians to leave the public sector. Thus, the
public health sector will suﬀer from a severe brain drain of the most able physicians.19
18For the particular case δ = 0, the HA is not concerned about dual practice and it will set the same
wage, w = ϕ2(1+λ) in both regimes. Since by allowing dual practice the HA is able to attract more doctors,
and hence to provide more health, regulation will be never in the HA’s interest.
19There is evidence that bans on dual practice in developing countries lead to a significant drain of
physicians from public to private practice as well as a migration of physicians to other countries with
better work conditions. See Globerman and Vining (1998) and Peters et al. (2002) for experiences in
South Africa and India respectively.
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Since the capacity of the public sector to produce health is directly linked to the ability
of the public physicians, losing the most able professionals is something the HA cannot
aﬀord. Note that in the case where for a given speciality the private sector is extremely
attractive, it will not be optimal for the HA even to maintain that specialty in the public
sector. The minimum wage that a physician would require (k) in that case would exceed
the marginal value of his contribution to the public sector
³q
f
1+λ
´
.20 If one accepts that
k may depend on the level of health care provision, the previous result indicates that in
developing economies it might be optimal in some cases to provide only primary health
care in the public sector.
Further analysis shows that, as the cost faced by the HA to allocate public funds
to the health service decreases (lower λ), health production technology becomes more
eﬃcient (higher f), or the cost of dual practice goes down (lower δ), then salaries in the
public sector rise, and an increasing number of practitioners work for the public sector
under the Laissez-Faire regime.21
4 Rewarding Policies
Let us now consider the policy of paying (on top of a salary wE) a premium ∆ ≥ 0 to
physicians who decide to work exclusively for the public sector (this bonus can also be
interpreted in terms of better career opportunities). In this section we investigate the
conditions under which this kind of policy, which is currently implemented in several
health systems (e.g. those of Spain, Portugal, and Italy), can be an optimal regulatory
tool.
In this setting, the physician’s utility, depending on the type of practice, is
Upub = wE +∆
UD = wE + k
2a
2
UPv = k2a.
The following lemma summarizes the physician’s decision as a function of his ability
and the contracts oﬀered in the public sector.
Lemma 2 Given (wE,∆, k), when dual practice is not restricted, the optimal decision of
a physician as a function of his ability a is as follows
20Note that the case with k >
q
f
1+λ , where the HA is confronted with a high k for all types of health
care (implying that no physician would work in the public sector), is left-out by Assumption 1 (ii).
21Under the Banning regime, wB and aB do not depend on λ and f, but notice that these parameters
aﬀect the threshold separating the diﬀerent regions in Proposition 2.
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• When ∆ > wE, then
if a ∈
h
0, w
E+∆
k2
i
he chooses to work only in the public sector
if a ∈
³
wE+∆
k2 , a¯
i
he chooses to work only in the private sector
• When ∆ ≤ wE, then,
if a ∈
£
0, 2∆k2
¤
he chooses to work only in the public sector
if a ∈
³
2∆
k2 ,
2wE
k2
i
he chooses dual practice
if a ∈
³
2wE
k2 , a¯
i
he chooses to work only in the private sector
Lemma 2 presents the optimal strategy for physician allocating time to diﬀerent types
of practice when exclusive contracts are enforced. The more skilled physicians tend to be
more involved in the private sector as their ability allows them to have a higher return.
The less skilled tend to be fully involved in public practice. It can be seen that by setting
∆ the HA can induce a situation in which no physician chooses to be a dual provider
(∆ > wE).22 Note also that if ∆ = 0 (there is no extra wage for exclusivity in the public
sector) then a physician will never work exclusively in the public sector. As k -which
summarizes the profitability of private practice- increases, less physicians tend to work
exclusively in the public sector.
This regulatory environment encompasses the laissez-faire (∆ = 0 and wE = wLF ) and
banning (wE = 0 and ∆ = wB) regimes examined in the previous section. What needs
further analysis are the conditions under which it actually pays for the HA to oﬀer a real
exclusive contract that induces some physicians to work solely in the public sector. As
the following proposition shows this depends crucially on the type of health care system.
Proposition 3 In developed economies, when the HA can oﬀer an exclusive contract
the best intervention is,
i) If δ ≤ 4(1+λ)ϕ not to regulate dual practice, fix ∆ = 0, and set a wage level
wE = wLF =
q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
ii) If δ ∈
³
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
to oﬀer an exclusive contract with
∆ =
ϕδ − 4 (1 + λ)
2δ (1 + λ)
< wE = wLF =
q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
22The fact that the bonus can exceed the baseline wage is a feature of the model, but the fact that it
has to be large enough in order to eﬀectively deter dual practice is not.
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iii) If δ > 8(1+λ)ϕ to ban dual practice, fix w
E = 0, and set an exclusivity premium
∆ = wB =
ϕ
2 (1 + λ)
We see how, in developed economies, whether it pays or not to allow dual practice
depends on its costs. If δ is low, it does not pay to try to reduce the incentives of
the physicians to work as dual suppliers. Exclusivity premiums are not paid and all
physicians working in the public sector are dual providers. As δ increases, it is more
and more profitable to pay an exclusivity premium in order to deter some physicians
from being dual providers. In that case, some physicians decide to work exclusively in
the public sector, some are dual providers and the remaining work solely in the private
sector. Finally, if δ is suﬃciently high, then it is in the HA’s interest to pay a premium
so high that it deters all physicians from dual practice (which is equivalent to banning
dual practice).
If we compare these results with those in Proposition 1, we find that the threshold
of the productivity loss beyond which it is optimal for the HA to ban dual practice is
strictly lower in the laissez-faire scenario
³
δ¯1 ≈ 5.988(1+λ)ϕ
´
than when exclusive contracts
are available
³
8(1+λ)
ϕ
´
. This illustrates how exclusive contracts oﬀer greater flexibility for
the HA to mitigate the loss of productivity associated with dual practice, which makes
the HA less interested in banning dual practice when rewarding policies are available.
However, as we now detail, the results for developing countries contrast sharply with
those just described.
Proposition 4 In developing economies the HA never finds it optimal to oﬀer an ex-
clusive contract to physicians. Instead, the decision is between no regulation and banning
dual practice altogether, as characterized in Proposition 2.
In developing countries a rewarding policy such as an exclusivity premium intended to
induce some physicians to work solely in the public sector is never an optimal intervention.
The reason is that such a policy would attract only the less able physicians (those with
lower prospects of private earnings). This also happens in developed economies, but the
characteristics of the health care systems in developing countries make the provision of
care much more dependent on physician ability. For this reason, it never pays to oﬀer an
extra premium as it only attracts those physicians with the smallest capacity to contribute
to health care production.
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5 Limiting Policies
In this section we consider scenarios in which the HA restricts dual practice. This is mod-
elled as a constraint fixed by the HA that limits physician involvement in dual practice.
We consider two possible restrictions: in the first, physician involvement in the private
sector is subject to a maximum of γ¯ ≥ 0; in the second one, the earnings of the public
physician in his private practice are limited to a maximum amount Π¯D. Then, given these
cut-oﬀs (γ¯ or Π¯D), physicians choose their level of involvement γ.
We characterize physician behavior when the option to engage in dual practice is sub-
ject to limitation. Recall that, in the absence of any regulation, the optimal involvement
in dual practice is γD (a) = k
2a
4
. Focusing first on an involvement constraint γ¯ ≥ 0, we
find:
Lemma 3 When there is a policy that limits the maximum involvement in dual practice
to γ¯, the physician’s amount of dual practice is
γ∗ (a) = γ¯ if a > 4γ¯k2 , and then U
D = w + 2k (aγ¯)1/2 − 2γ¯
γ∗ (a) = k
2a
4
if a ≤ 4γ¯k2 , and then UD = w +
k2a
2
.
Consequently for a given (γ¯, w) the physician’s optimal choice is:
• If γ¯ ≥ w
2
, the limiting policy is ineﬀective and the physician’s decision coincides with
that in Lemma 1, part a).
• If γ¯ < w
2
, the limiting policy is eﬀective and
if a ∈
£
0, 4γ¯k2
¤
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
if a ∈
µ
4γ¯
k2 ,
w+2
√
γ¯(w−γ¯)
k2
¸
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γ¯
if a ∈
µ
w+2
√
γ¯(w−γ¯)
k2 , a¯
¸
the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.
The second limiting policy constrains the revenue that the physician can obtain from
his dual practice to a maximum of Π¯D. In this case, given the cut-oﬀ Π¯D, the physician
may choose any level of dual practice γ, provided the private revenues are such that
2k
√
aγ − 2γ ≤ Π¯D. Let us denote by γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
the level of dual practice that a physician
with ability a will choose when he is subject to a limiting policy Π¯D.
Lemma 4 When there is a policy that limits the maximum private earnings obtained in
dual practice to Π¯D, the physician’s amount of dual practice is
γ∗ (a) = γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
< k
2a
4
if a > 2Π¯
D
k2 , and then U
D = w + Π¯D
γ∗ (a) = k
2a
4
if a ≤ 2Π¯Dk2 , and then UD = w +
k2a
2
.
Accordingly, given
¡
Π¯D, w
¢
the physician’s optimal choice is:
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• If Π¯D ≥ w, the limiting policy is ineﬀective and the physician’s decision coincides
with that in Lemma 1, part a).
• If Π¯D < w, the limiting policy is eﬀective and
if a ∈
h
0, 2Π¯
D
k2
i
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
if a ∈
³
2Π¯D
k2 ,
wπ¯+Π¯
D
k2
i
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
< k
2a
4
if a ∈
³
wπ¯+Π¯
D
k2 , a¯
i
the physician chooses to work only in the private sector.
When earnings limitations are eﬀective, dual practice depends (in a negative way)
on the physician ability a and on the profitability parameter k: γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
= k
2a
2
−
1
2
³
Π¯D +
q
k2a
¡
k2a− 2Π¯D
¢´
> 0, which is a decreasing function of a. This means that
the more able physicians, as well as those working in more profitable specialties, are con-
strained to be less involved in private practice if they work at all for the public sector.
In other words, all the physicians above a certain level of ability or profitability will have
the same utility. Hence, more able doctors in more profitable disciplines will be more
tempted to work exclusively for the private sector.
Let us compare now these two types of limiting policies.
Proposition 5 Both for developing and developed economies, a policy of limiting
involvement in private practice always dominates a policy of limiting earnings from
dual practice.
The intuition for this result has to do with how the two policies aﬀect diﬀerent types
of physicians. Overall, profit limitations have a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual
practice performed by physicians. Under a policy that limits profits to Π¯D, the more
able physicians, those with a > 2Π¯
D
k2 , will be forced to allocate significantly less time to
private practice in order to satisfy their earning constraint. Meanwhile dual-practicing
physicians with a relatively low ability are not constrained by this policy because even
if they engage in a high amount of dual practice their earnings are relatively low. In
contrast, policies that limit involvement directly target the intensity of dual practice
and are therefore more eﬀective in limiting its costs. It is important to highlight that the
dominance of involvement limits over income limits is fairly general: it does not depend on
the particular characteristics of the health care system under consideration and therefore
applies to both developing and more developed economies.23
23In fact this result can be extended to a more general model without the need to resort to particular
functional forms. Moreover, the result is also robust to assuming the public sector payment to be
dependent on physician ability. The details are available from the authors upon request.
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The next step is to characterize the shape of the optimal limiting policy for the two
alternative health care systems under consideration. FromLemma 3 we see that if the limit
is too soft (γ¯ ≥ w
2
), then the policy is ineﬀective as the maximum-involvement constraint
is not binding for any of the physicians that actually work for the public sector, and we
are trivially back to the laissez-faire scenario. Therefore, the HA solves
max
w,γ¯
W γ¯ =
Z 4γ¯
k2
0
F (a)
1 + δk
2a
4
da+
Z w+2√γ¯(w−γ¯)
k2
4γ¯
k2
F (a)
1 + δγ¯
da− (1 + λ)w
Ã
w + 2
p
γ¯ (w − γ¯)
k2
!
(5)
s.t. w ≥ 0, w + 2
p
γ¯ (w − γ¯)
k2
≤ a¯, 0 ≤ γ¯ ≤ w
2
.
Let us first consider a developed economy,
Proposition 6 In developed economies, when the HA can limit physician involvement
in private practice,
• It is never optimal to fully ban dual practice, i.e., γ¯ = 0 is never a solution.
• If δ ≤ 2(1+λ)ϕ the best the HA can do is not to limit dual practice.
• If δ > 2(1+λ)ϕ there exists an optimal limit to the amount of dual practice.
Two main insights emerge from Proposition 6. First, no matter how large the cost of
dual practice, it is never in the best interest of the HA to ban it. The policy to limit
dual practice is suﬃciently rich so as to cope with diﬀerent degrees of productivity loss.
Secondly, there are values of the productivity loss (δ < 2(1+λ)ϕ ) for which it is in the best
interest of the HA not to limit dual practice at all. The reason is that any limiting policy
will reduce the profitability of dual practice and thus incline physicians towards working
exclusively in the private sector. If the HA wants to keep those workers in the public
sector it has to compensate them by paying a higher salary. For this reason, only when
the cost of dual practice is suﬃciently large does the HA find it profitable to incur the
extra cost (higher wages) of imposing a limit on dual practice. In the proof of this result
it is also clear that the decision to restrict dual practice does not depend on k, although
k will aﬀect the number of physicians eventually hired in the public sector.
Now let us consider developing countries, for which the results are substantially dif-
ferent.
Proposition 7 In developing economies, when the HA can limit physician involvement
in private practice
• For high values of k the best the HA can do is not to limit dual practice.
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• For intermediate values of k there is an optimal limit to the involvement in private
practice.
• For low values of k the best the HA can do is either to limit dual practice (if δ is
low) or to ban it (if δ is high).
The results for developing economies sharply diﬀer from those in the previous scenario.
The attractiveness of the private sector (measured by k) turns out to be the key variable
when characterizing the optimal policy. When the private alternative is very attractive,
the establishment of limits to dual practice is never optimal. In this case, setting a limiting
policy would make it very expensive to keep highly skilled physicians and the loss of such
professionals would severely undermine the HA’s capacity to provide health. When the
private sector is relatively unattractive, a limiting policy might be also not optimal for the
opposite reason: in this case, it is relatively cheap to retain physicians at public facilities
and, thus, when the cost of dual practice δ is suﬃciently high, theHA is better oﬀ banning
rather than limiting dual practice. Thus banning dual practice can emerge in developing
economies as the best intervention.24 Finally, when the attractiveness of the private sector
is moderate limits are always optimal in developing countries. The reason is two-fold. On
the one hand, setting limits can help to reduce the loss of eﬃciency associated with dual
practice without the risk of brain-drain, i.e. losing high-ability physicians to the private
sector. But, on the other hand, keeping physicians in the public sector is not cheap enough
to justify banning dual practice altogether.
6 The Optimal Policy-Mix to Regulate Dual Practice
In this section we combine previous results to present a comprehensive picture of the
policy options available to the HA for the regulation of dual practice, and we oﬀer some
policy implications.
6.1 The Health Authority’s Choice
Combining the propositions discussed in previous sections we obtain the following result:
Proposition 8 The optimal decision of the HA is
• In developed economies,
24Our intuition is that the conclusion that for low values of k banning dominates if δ is high does not
depend on the class of convex cost of eﬀort functions we have considered. Considering a strictly convex
quadratic disutility function is, however, much more cumbersome.
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— If δ ≤ 2(1+λ)ϕ not to regulate dual practice.
— If δ > 2(1+λ)ϕ to impose a limit (but never a ban) on the physician involvement
in dual practice.
• In developing economies the results in Proposition 7 directly apply.
In developed countries we have shown that it suﬃces to concentrate on the decision of
whether to limit physicians’ involvement in the private sector. Note that this policy (whose
extreme cases are analyzed in Section 3) also dominates exclusive contracts. Thus, the
choice of optimal intervention depends on the cost of the dual practice. When this cost is
low, the best policy is to leave dual practice unregulated. When the cost of dual practice is
suﬃciently severe, the best policy is to limit physicians’ capacity to engage in dual practice.
While the intensity of the productivity losses caused by dual practice will determine the
stringency of this limit, banning dual practice is never worthwhile. An important insight
that emerges from this comparison is the suboptimality of rewarding policies as a way to
handle the negative consequences of dual practice. Although Proposition 3 states that
for intermediate values of δ, δ ∈
³
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
, exclusive contracts are preferable to
the extremes of laissez-faire and banning, for these values of δ it is even better to limit
physicians’ capacity to engage in dual practice.
For developing countries the comparison of the diﬀerent regulatory policies is easier,
as exclusive contracts are never optimal. The most important variable for determining
the best policy mix turns out to be the attractiveness of the private sector. If the private
sector is very attractive (i.e., k is high), then regardless of the cost of dual practice the
HA should not impose any regulation. The reason is that any intervention would trigger a
severe brain-drain of the most skilled professionals to the private sector and, because of the
degree to which health provision in such countries depends on individual characteristics
of physicians (due to less stringent practice protocols, etc.), this drain would severely
damage the public provision of health care. In reverse, the same argument can be used to
explain why a relatively unattractive private sector can result in the optimality of banning
dual practice altogether. A limiting policy is optimal for intermediate values of k, i.e.,
not so low as to make banning aﬀordable, and not so high as to trigger a brain-drain.
Likewise, for low values of k setting a limit to the involvement in dual practice is the best
policy when the cost of dual practice is relatively low.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the optimal policy choice for the two diﬀerent scenarios
considered, based on the results in Propositions 7 and 8.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
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6.2 Policy Implications
We now describe the most important policy guidelines that can be extracted from our
work and suggest some possible extensions of the analysis.
The relevance of the private sector attractiveness
One of the key variables for our results is private sector attractiveness (k). It seems
clear that in practice this variable presents a wide and probably multi-dimensional het-
erogeneity. Specifically, we think it is important to consider (i) diﬀerences between devel-
oping and developed countries, and (ii) diﬀerences within countries (among specialities,
or between primary physicians and specialists).
Regarding the first source of heterogeneity, we expect that the value of k will be high
in developing countries where there are substantial revenue diﬀerences between public
and private sectors and also between specialities. This fact points not only to a general
tendency for physicians to be inclined toward heavier involvement in private provision,
but also to the risk of brain-drain, i.e. loss of the most highly skilled medical professionals.
This problem is exacerbated when limits are imposed on dual practice as a way to obtain
extra revenue. With regard to this problem, our model predicts that in countries where
the private alternative is very attractive the argument against regulating dual practice
is correspondingly strong: if dual practice is regulated, the recruitment and retention of
highly skilled physicians in the public sector becomes prohibitively expensive.
If, on the contrary, we consider k as speciality-specific, we observe that for specialties
with a large private sector attractiveness, the health authority will choose to hire few
physicians and provide a small level of public health. In other words, a high level of k
points toward the crowding out of public provision by increased private provision. This
eﬀect is reinforced in our set-up by the fact that we have not imposed a lower bound on
the amount of public health that should be guaranteed. Our setting, nevertheless, could
be adapted to encompass circumstances in which there are specialities with large k which
are deemed indispensable for the public sector (such as anesthesiologists, for instance)
and, hence, whose level of production cannot be substantially reduced. In this case, our
analysis would suggest that such essential specialities should receive higher salaries and
softer regulations regarding dual practice.
Enforceability of policies
Our analysis makes the best-case assumption that policies are enforceable at zero cost,
and hence ignores enforcement issues that can be important to practical policy application.
However, we admit that the implementation of such regulations is seldom an easy task,
especially in developing countries where the institutional and contracting environments
are often weak.25
25With regard to this issue, Eggleston and Bir (2006) argue that the social trade-oﬀ between the benefits
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Although we have not included enforceability concerns in our analysis, we can make
a few observations regarding this important issue. First, one might argue that it may be
easier to control earnings than involvement. This may oﬀer an explanation to why some
countries seem compelled to use this regulatory tool despite our finding that limits on
involvement are, ceteris paribus, more eﬃcient. Secondly, in the same vein, encouraging
public physicians to perform private practice in public facilities may facilitate the moni-
toring of actual involvement in dual practice and thus aid in the enforcement of limiting
policies. This is consistent with the pattern of several European countries, as described
in the Introduction. Thirdly, regarding rewarding policies, these may be easy to enforce,
or at least easier than any limiting policy. Thus, in more developed countries we can ra-
tionalize the use of exclusive contracts to induce some physicians to give up dual practice
as a second best choice (when other kinds of policies are diﬃcult to enforce).
The cost of raising public funds
In our model the HA maximizes net profits, i.e. the value associated with the produc-
tion of health minus the wages paid to the physicians. The wage costs are weighted by λ,
that represents the marginal cost of allocating more resources to public health provision.
In this respect, if one expects that during an economic recession λ is higher due to more
stringent budget constraints, our model provides an argument in favour of non-regulation
both in developed and developing countries. Since any regulation makes the hiring of
practitioners more expensive, whenever the budget is tight it is clear that the best policy
is not to control dual practice.
Also, considering diﬀerent values for λ provides an alternative way to compare devel-
oped and developing economies. In this respect, Auriol and Picard (2009) report that
for developed countries λ has been estimated to be low, around 0.3 (Snow and Warren,
1996), while in developing countries it is three times higher, 0.9 (World Bank, 1998), and
it can be much higher in countries heavily indebted. If we use these diﬀerences in λ as
the basis for the comparison between developed and less developed economies, then our
results predict that in developed countries it is more likely that dual practice should be
limited, while in developing economies it should remain unregulated.
The cost of dual practice
The results in this paper depend on the cost of dual practice in terms of public perfor-
mance. Theoretical analyses on the eﬀects of dual practice on public health provision are
scarce and show that this practice might bring about both positive and negative eﬀects.
It appears, however, that the arguments about the negative consequences of physician
dual practice dominate the literature. Ferrinho et al. (2004), for instance, provide some
evidence of the consequences of dual practice in terms of extracting more income from
and costs of dual practice crucially depend on the quality of a country’s contracting institutions.
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patients, reducing time served in public health posts, conflicts of interest, and even cor-
ruption, which suggests that the cost of dual practice, which is summarized by δ in our
model, is positive. However, the real cost of dual practice for health systems is an empir-
ical issue and there are no reliable studies that estimate this cost. Still, one would expect
the value of δ be higher, due to weaker monitoring, mild self-regulation, etc., in devel-
oping countries. Interestingly, our model shows that while large values of δ point to the
use of limits in more developed economies, this is not necessarily the case in developing
countries, where the attractiveness of the private sector is crucial and may point to no
intervention as the best option.
Health production technology
One may reasonably argue that the average productivity of the health care system in
a developing country is lower than that of a developed country (that is why a developed
country has chosen the technology ϕ, and corresponds to having ϕ > f
2
a¯). This diﬀerence
suggests a new argument in favour of limiting dual practice in developed countries while
de-regulating it in developing ones. This argument follows from our findings that in both
economies lower technology implies less interest on the part of the HA to regulate dual
practice.
Finally, as previously mentioned, within a given health care system diﬀerent specialties
may have access to diﬀerent health technologies. Restating our results in this regard would
suggest that specialities that are less technology-intensive and where the discretionality
of doctors is higher are, ceteris paribus, worse candidates for regulation.
7 Conclusions
Dual practice is a complex phenomenon occurring in the public health systems of many
developed and developing countries. In this paper we have considered some of the impor-
tant factors that determine the optimal regulation for this practice and discussed diﬀerent
policy options. We have analyzed the optimal regulation under diﬀerent hypotheses con-
cerning the public health production function (as a way of describing the situations of
diﬀerent countries) and various policy instruments. The desirability of these instruments
depends on the government ability to control physician dual practice but, more impor-
tantly, on the specific characteristics of the health sector in question.
In a very simple set-up our analysis has provided several interesting insights regard-
ing the optimal regulation of dual practice. First, we have found that forbidding dual
practice is seldom optimal, as it usually expels valuable professionals–indeed, the most
valuable, if the private market rewards quality–from the public system. In this sense,
dual practice can serve to the budgetary expenses needed to retain high-skilled physicians
25
working in public facilities. Secondly, focusing on limiting policies, we have shown that
limiting income is always less eﬀective than limiting involvement. The reason is that the
former policy has a milder eﬀect on the amount of dual practice performed, as it only
aﬀects the high skilled physicians that are compelled to reduce private involvement in
order to satisfy their earning constraint. Finally, our analysis has suggested that policy
recommendations are diﬀerent for more developed and developing economies, thus oﬀer-
ing theoretical support for the desirability of diﬀerent regulations in diﬀerent economic
environments. In developed countries the key factor is the potential negative eﬀect of dual
practice on public performance: when this eﬀect is low the best option is not to intervene;
when it is suﬃciently high the best option is to impose a limit on physician involvement.
Rewarding policies, i.e. those that pay an extra amount to physicians who give up their
private practice, are only desirable when limitations are diﬃcult to enforce. For devel-
oping countries, the design of the optimal policy is more complex as it also depends on
the attractiveness of the private sector. When this attractiveness is very high the best
option is not to intervene and thereby avoid an exodus of highly skilled physicians from
the public sector. When it takes an intermediate value, then limits on the involvement
are desirable. Finally, if the potential gains from private practice are low, the optimal
intervention is either to limit dual practice (if the associated costs are low) or to ban it (if
such costs are high). Rewarding contracts are never optimal in these countries as those
physicians that would accept them are the ones with the smallest capacity to contribute
to the production of health.
In our view, the main contribution of our paper is to identify the multiple factors that
should guide the choice of the optimal regulatory policies on dual practice. Certainly, in
order to evaluate the performance of countries in regard to dual practice and be able to
make informed country-specific recommendations, more theoretical and empirical work is
needed. Still, we believe that this work can enrich the discussion on dual practice and
contribute to the development of a better policy making process.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
Immediate from the comparison of Upub; UD and UPv when dual practice is allowed or
banned.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
The HA has to solve, and compare, two independent optimization problems.
Case laissez-faire: The HA solves Program (3) for F (a) = ϕ, subject to the constraints
w ≥ 0 and w ≤ a¯k2
2
. From the f.o.c. we obtain the following candidate to optimum
wLF =
q
1 + δϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
> 0 if a¯ >
2
k2δ
Ãr
δϕ
λ+ 1
+ 1− 1
!
(6)
wLF =
k2a¯
2
otherwise. (7)
Note that wLF (δ) is a decreasing function of δ, and wLF (δ = 0) = a¯k
2
2
. Moreover, it can
be checked that the objective function is concave and, hence, that for the interior solution
the s.o.c. is fulfilled. Note that Assumption1 (i) implies a¯ ≥ 2k2δ
³q
δϕ
λ+1 + 1− 1
´
, so we
can concentrate on the interior solution. Evaluating the objective function in the optimal
level of wage we have
WLF ¡wLF¢ = Z 2k2δt1+ δϕ1+λ−1
0
ϕ
1
4
ak2δ + 1
da− (1 + λ) 2
k2δ2
Ãr
1 +
δϕ
1 + λ
− 1
!2
(8)
The Envelope Theorem ensures that WLF ¡wLF¢ is decreasing in δ. If we evaluate in the
two extreme values of δ we have
lim
δ→0
WLF ¡wLF ¢ = ϕ2
2 (1 + λ) k2
lim
δ→+∞
WLF ¡wLF ¢ = 0
Case dual practice banned: The HA solves Program (4) for F (a) = ϕ, subject to the
constraints w ≥ 0 and w ≤ a¯k2. Solving the f.o.c. we obtain the following candidate to
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optimum
wB =
ϕ
2 (1 + λ)
> 0 if
ϕ
2 (1 + λ) k2
≤ a¯, (9)
wB = a¯k2 otherwise. (10)
Note that Assumption 1 (i) implies a¯ ≥ ϕ
2(1+λ)k2 , so we can concentrate on the interior
solution. Moreover, it can be checked that the objective function is concave and at the
interior solution the s.o.c. is fulfilled. Evaluating the objective function in the optimal
level of wage we have
WB ¡wB¢ = ϕ2
4 (1 + λ) k2
, (11)
that does not depend on δ.
Comparison: By comparing WLF ¡wLF ¢ and WB ¡wB¢ , it follows directly that there
exists a threshold δ¯1 > 0 such that:
• If 0 < δ < δ¯1, WLF
¡
wLF
¢
>WB ¡wB¢ and, hence, the optimal decision is to allow
dual practice.
• If δ > δ¯1, WLF
¡
wLF
¢
< WB ¡wB¢ and, hence, the optimal decision is to ban dual
practice.
We finally show that δ¯1 ' 5.988 (1+λ)ϕ . Let us write δ = x(1+λ)ϕ . Then
WLF
µ
δ =
x (1 + λ)
ϕ
¶
=
ϕ2
(1 + λ) k2
∙
4
x
ln
µ
1
2
√
x+ 1 +
1
2
¶
− 2
x2
³√
x+ 1− 1
´2¸
that we have to compare with WB ¡wB¢ as defined in (11). Hence,
WLF <WB ⇔ 4
x
ln
µ
1
2
√
x+ 1 +
1
2
¶
− 2
x2
³√
x+ 1− 1
´2
<
1
4
⇔ x > 5.988
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
The HA has to solve two independent optimization problems.
Case laissez-faire: The HA solves Program (3) for F (a) = fa, subject to the constraint
that w ≥ 0 and w ≤ a¯k2
2
. First note that for δ = 0 the welfare function can be written as:
max
w
WLF (δ = 0) = 2w2
µ
f
k2
− (1 + λ)
¶
Hence, for δ = 0 the solution is
wLF (δ = 0) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a¯k2
2
if k <
q
f
1+λ
0 if k ≥
q
f
1+λ
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For δ > 0, solving the f.o.c. we obtain the following candidate to optimum
wLF =
2 (f − (1 + λ) k2)
δ (1 + λ) k2
. (12)
This wage level is positive only if k <
q
f
1+λ . Therefore, the candidate to solution is:
wLF =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
min
½
2(f−(1+λ)k2)
δ(1+λ)k2 ,
a¯k2
2
¾
if k <
q
f
1+λ
0 if k ≥
q
f
1+λ
Assumption 1(ii) rules out the corner case with k ≥
q
f
1+λ . Moreover, it can be checked
that, for the interior solution, the objective function is concave and, hence, that the s.o.c.
is fulfilled. The value of the objective function at the optimal interior solution under
laissez-faire contract is:
WLF ¡wLF¢ = Z 2(f−(1+λ)k
2)
δ(1+λ)k4
0
fa
1 + δ k
2a
4
da− (1 + λ) 2
k2
µ
f − (1 + λ) k2
δ (1 + λ) k2
¶2
(13)
The Envelope Theorem ensures that WLF ¡wLF¢ is decreasing in δ. If we evaluate in the
two extreme values of δ we have
lim
δ→0
WLF ¡wLF¢ = WLF µwLF = a¯k2
2
¶
=
a¯2
2
¡
f − (1 + λ) k2
¢
lim
δ→+∞
WLF ¡wLF¢ = 0
Case dual practice banned: The HA solves Program (4) for F (a) = fa, subject to the
constraints that w ≥ 0 and w ≤ a¯k2. This objective function is monotone in w. Hence,
the solution is always on the boundaries of the support. Either wB = a¯k2 or wB = 0
depending on whether k ≤
q
f
2(1+λ) or not. Again, under Assumption 1 (ii), values of
k ≥
q
f
1+λ are not possible and we can concentrate on k <
q
f
2(1+λ) , which gives,
WB ¡wB¢ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
a¯2
¡f
2
− (1 + λ) k2
¢
if k ≤
q
f
2(1+λ)
0 if k ∈
³q
f
2(1+λ) ,
q
f
1+λ
i (14)
Comparison: Considering the value functions with and without banning we get,
• If k ∈
³q
f
2(1+λ) ,
q
f
1+λ
i
then WB ¡wB¢ <WLF ¡wLF¢
• If k ≤
q
f
2(1+λ) then, there exists a threshold δ¯2 > 0 such that,
— If δ < δ¯2 then WB
¡
wB
¢
<WLF ¡wLF¢
— If δ > δ¯2 then WB
¡
wB
¢
>WLF ¡wLF¢ .
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.
From the physician’s utility under the diﬀerent choices Upub, UD and UPv, we obtain the
results presented in the lemma.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.
We need to distinguish two cases depending on whether ∆ > wE or ∆ ≤ wE. If we are in
the case with ∆ > wE then no physician works as dual provider. In this case, trivially,
the best contract is the optimal banning contract (as defined in Lemma 2). Therefore, in
the region ∆ > wE, the best contract yields a value function
WE
µ
∆ =
ϕ
2 (1 + λ)
, wE = 0
¶
=
ϕ2
4 (1 + λ) k2
We need to focus, therefore, on the case with ∆ ≤ wE. The objective function of the
HA in this case is
max
wE ,∆
WE =
Z 2∆
k2
0
ϕda+
Z 2wE
k2
2∆
k2
ϕ
1 + δ k
2a
4
da−(1 + λ)
µ
2∆
k2
¡
wE +∆
¢
+
µ
2wE
k2
− 2∆
k2
¶
wE
¶
,
subject to the constraints, wE ≥ 0, wE ≤ a¯k2
2
and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ wE. We first ignore the
constraint wE ≤ a¯k2
2
and check afterwards that it is satisfied by the solution. The f.o.c.’s
of this program are:
∂WE
∂w
=
2 (1 + λ)
k2
∙
2ϕ
(1 + λ) (2 + δw)
− 2w
¸
= 0
∂WE
∂∆
=
2 (1 + λ)
k2
∙
ϕ
(1 + λ)
µ
1− 1
2 + δ∆
¶
− 2∆
¸
= 0
From here it follows that wE =
√
1+δ ϕ
1+λ−1
δ > 0 (the s.o.c. is trivially fulfilled).
Regarding ∆ there are two candidates that verify the f.o.c. First, ∆∗ = 0 that fulfills
the s.o.c. provided δ ≤ 4(1+λ)ϕ . Secondly, ∆∗ =
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) that fulfills the s.o.c. only if
δ ≥ 4(1+λ)ϕ . Finally, when ∆∗ =
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) we also have to check the constraint ∆
∗ ≤ w∗:
∆∗ ≤ w∗ ⇐⇒ δ ≤ 8 (1 + λ)
ϕ
.
Therefore, the solution in the region ∆ ≤ wE is
wE =
q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
∆ =
(
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) if δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
0 if δ ≤ 4(1+λ)ϕ
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It only rests to evaluate the HA’s objective function in the solution of this case and
compare it with WE
³
∆ = ϕ
2(1+λ) , w
E = 0
´
.
The Envelope Theorem ensures thatWE
µ
∆ = max
n
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) , 0
o
, wE =
√
1+δ ϕ
1+λ−1
δ
¶
is decreasing in δ. Therefore the value of the objective function is bounded below by the
value it would take for the upper bound of δ (i.e., δ = 8(1+λ)ϕ ).
It can be shown that,
lim
δ→ 8(1+λ)ϕ
WE
⎛
⎝∆∗ = max
½
ϕδ − 4 (1 + λ)
2δ (1 + λ)
, 0
¾
, wE∗ =
q
1 + δ ϕ
1+λ − 1
δ
⎞
⎠ = ϕ
2
4 (1 + λ) k2
,
and this is equal to WE
³
∆∗ = ϕ
2(1+λ) , w
∗ = 0
´
. In addition, it is easy to check that the
constraint wE ≤ a¯k2
2
is satisfied by the solution. Therefore, we have shown that,
• For every δ < 8(1+λ)ϕ , the solution is
wE =
q
1 + δ
1+λϕ− 1
δ
∆ =
(
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) if δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
0 if δ ≤ 4(1+λ)ϕ
sinceWE
µ
∆ = max
n
ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) , 0
o
, wE =
√
1+δ ϕ
1+λ−1
δ
¶
>WE
³
∆ = ϕ
2(1+λ) , w
E = 0
´
.
• For every δ > 8(1+λ)ϕ , the solution is wE = 0, and ∆ = ϕ2(1+λ) .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.
As in the previous proposition, we need to distinguish two cases depending on whether
∆ > wE or ∆ ≤ wE. If we are in the case with ∆ > wE then no physician works as
dual provider. In this case, trivially, the best contract is the optimal banning contract (as
defined in Lemma 2). Therefore, in the region ∆ > wE, the best contract yields a value
function WB ¡wB¢ defined in (14).
We need to focus, therefore, on the case with ∆ ≤ wE. The objective function of the
HA in this case is
max
w,∆
WE = f
⎡
⎣
Z 2∆
k2
0
ada+
Z 2wE
k2
2∆
k2
a
1 + δ k
2a
4
da
⎤
⎦− 2 (1 + λ)
k2
¡
∆2 + w2E
¢
,
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subject to the constraints, wE ≥ 0, wE ≤ a¯k2
2
and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ wE. We ignore first the
constraint wE ≤ a¯k2
2
and check afterwards that it is satisfied by the solution. The f.o.c.’s
of this program are:
∂WE
∂w
=
4
k2
w
µ
2f
k2 (2 + wδ)
− (1 + λ)
¶
= 0
∂WE
∂∆
=
4
k2
∆
µ
f
µ
1− 2
(2 + w∆)
¶
− (1 + λ)
¶
= 0
Assumption 1(ii) implies k <
q
f
(1+λ) and there are two candidates that satisfy the f.o.c.
for each variable:
w∗ = 0 or w∗ =
2 (f − (1 + λ) k2)
(1 + λ) k2δ
∆∗ = 0 or ∆∗ =
2 (1 + λ) k2
δ (f − (1 + λ) k2)
When checking the s.o.c. it is easy to check that ∆∗ = 2(1+λ)k
2
δ(f−(1+λ)k2) cannot be a solution,
as the s.o.c only holds for values of k such that ∆∗ = 2(1+λ)k
2
δ(f−(1+λ)k2) < 0. Thus, there does
not exist a solution with ∆∗ > 0 and ∆ ≤ wE. The optimal contract, therefore, will be
the one in Proposition 2. This also shows that constraint wE ≤ a¯k2
2
is satisfied by the
solution.
A.7 Proof of Lemmas 3 and 4.
From the physician’s utility under the diﬀerent choices Upub, UD (that depends on the
limiting policy) and UPv, we obtain the results presented in the lemma.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5.
We first define each policy by a pair:
¡
Π¯D, wπ¯
¢
and (γ¯, wγ¯) . Each policy, in turn, will
determines a series of thresholds (as defined in Lemmas 3 and 4) that characterize the
behavior of the physicians.
To do the proof, we show that for any possible earnings limitation, we can find a
policy of limiting the involvement in private practice that is more eﬃcient (it provides
more health at the same costs).
Consider any policy of limiting private earnings
¡
Π¯D, wπ¯
¢
. This contract can give rise
to diﬀerent scenarios. Let us study them independently:
Non-binding Policy: (Π¯D ≥ wπ¯) Consider that the limit to earnings is so high that
it is not binding for any of the physicians that actually work for the public sector. In
other words, the first physician that would be aﬀected by the policy is one that already
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chooses to work solely in the private sector. In this case, as Lemma 4 states, the policy is
irrelevant. Thus, any policy of limiting the involvement in private practice with the same
salaries wγ¯ = wπ¯, and with a γ¯ so high that is not binding for any physician (i.e., with
γ¯ > wγ¯
2
) is, by construction, as good as the original Π¯D-policy.
Binding policy: (Π¯D < wπ¯) The limit is such that some physicians are unconstrained
dual providers, while others are aﬀected by the policy. Formally, following Lemma 4, under¡
Π¯D, wπ¯
¢
the physicians with a ≤ wπ¯+Π¯
D
k2 are involved in dual practice. We will propose
a policy that limits the involvement in private practice (γ¯, wγ¯) that is more eﬃcient than¡
Π¯D, wπ¯
¢
.
Consider a policy that sets wγ¯ = wπ¯ = w and γ¯ such that the physician that is indiﬀerent
between being a dual provider or leaving the public sector is the same under the two
policies. From Lemmas 3 and 4, this value of γ¯ is such that
w + 2
p
γ¯ (w − γ¯)
k2
=
w + Π¯D
k2
⇐⇒ 2
p
γ¯ (w − γ¯) = Π¯D
In words, this means that the physician with ability a = w+Π¯
D
k2 (denote this threshold
aˆ) when limited through maximum earnings Π¯D will perform an amount of dual practice
exactly equal to γ¯. Function F (γ¯) = 2
p
γ¯ (w − γ¯) gets value zero at γ¯ = 0 and γ¯ = w,
and has a maximum at γ¯ = w
2
, where F (γ¯ = w
2
) = w > Π¯D. Hence, F (γ¯) = Π¯D is defined
by the pair γ¯ = 1
2
µ
w ±
q
w2 −
¡
Π¯D
¢2¶
, which are always well defined since we are in
the region with Π¯D < wπ¯. Nevertheless, only the negative root is compatible with the
restriction for a policy of limiting the involvement to be binding for some physicians, i.e.,
γ¯ ≤ w
2
. Therefore, we set γ¯ = 1
2
µ
w −
q
w2 −
¡
Π¯D
¢2¶ ∈ ¡0, w
2
¢
.
Now, let us compare the amount of dual practice that dual providers exert with each
policy.
Under the γ¯-policy
if a ∈
£
0, 4γ¯k2
¤
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
if a ∈
¡
4γ¯
k2 , aˆ
¤
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γ¯
Under the Π¯D-policy
if a ∈
h
0, 2Π¯
D
k2
i
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = k
2a
4
if a ∈
³
2Π¯D
k2 , aˆ
i
the physician chooses dual practice and γ∗ (a) = γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
< k
2a
4
Those physicians in a ∈
³
2Π¯D
k2 , aˆ
i
do an amount of dual practice γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
such that
ΠD(γˆ (a)) = 2k
q
aγˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
− 2γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
= Π¯D
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Note that we have constructed γ¯ in such a way that γˆ
¡
aˆ, Π¯D
¢
= γ¯. This, together with
the fact that γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
is decreasing in a implies that for every a ∈
h
2Π¯D
k2 , aˆ
´
we have
γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
> γ¯. Finally, we need to check that 4γ¯k2 <
2Π¯D
k2 or, analogously, that 2γ¯ < Π¯
D.
This is true for any binding Π¯D-policy, since,
2γ¯ =
³
w −
p
w2 − Π¯D2
´
< Π¯D ⇔ Π¯D < w
With this, we have that the amount of dual practice performed by the physicians under
the two policies is:
Level of ability γ¯-policy Π¯D-policy
a ∈
£
0, 4γ¯k2
¢
γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
a ∈
h
4γ¯
k2 ,
2Π¯D
k2
´
γ¯ γ∗ (a) = γD (a) = k
2a
4
> γ¯
a ∈
h
2Π¯D
k2 , aˆ
´
γ¯ γˆ
¡
a, Π¯D
¢
> γ¯
a = aˆ γ¯ γˆ
¡
aˆ, Π¯D
¢
= γ¯
Under the γ¯-policy, some physicians, all those in the range of abilities a ∈
£
4γ¯
k2 , aˆ
¢
, do
less dual practice under the γ¯-policy than under the Π¯D-policy. Therefore, the γ¯-policy
dominates as it implies paying the same wages, having the same amount of physicians
working in the public sector, but a lower amount of dual practice, what causes a lower
aggregate productivity loss.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6.
The HA solves Program (5), for F (a) = ϕ.
We make some manipulations on the objective function in order to work with a more
compact optimization program. This is done without loss of generality. First, we do a
change of variable and define α ≡ γ¯w ∈ [0,
1
2
], where α = 0 corresponds to γ¯ = 0 (banning
dual practice) and α = 1
2
corresponds to γ¯ = w
2
(laissez-faire). We also force a common
factor 1+λ
δ2k2
to the whole function, this yields:
Wα=1 + λ
δ2k2
Ã
ϕδ
1 + λ
Ã
4 ln(1 + αδw) +
δw
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2 − 4α
¢
1 + αδw
!
− (δw)2
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´!
,
which shows that the solution to the program will be independent of the parameter k.We
finally rename the combined parameter δϕ
1+λ as xe, the product δw as w˜, and A ≡ δk2a¯,
that by Assumption 1 (i) implies A ≥ x. The previous optimization program is equivalent
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to solving:
max
w˜,α
W =
Ã
x
Ã
4 ln(1 + αw˜) +
w˜
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2 − 4α
¢
1 + αw˜
!
−w˜2
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´!
s.t. w˜ ≥ 0, w˜
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´
≤ A and α ∈
∙
0,
1
2
¸
,
This program is simpler (but equivalent) to the original one. The variable that deter-
mines the intensity of the limiting policy, α, is defined over a compact set and, moreover,
there is only one parameter that is relevant for the optimization (x) instead of three (λ,
ϕ, δ) in the original program.
To solve this program, using Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we have to consider the five
candidates to solution. These candidates are:
(i) w˜ = 0, in which case W = 0.
(ii) w˜ = A
(1+2
√
α−α2)
, in which case W is a function of α parametrized by A:
W = x
Ã
4 ln
Ã
1 + α
A¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢!+ A ¡1 + 2√α− α2 − 4α¢¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢
+ αA
!
− A
2¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢ .
Note that when x is small as compared to A, this candidate leads to negative values
of W . In fact, often, even when x is very close to A, under this candidate W
is negative. The maximum in α(A) is diﬃcult to find analytically but it can be
computed numerically and compared to the other candidates to solution.
(iii) α = 0, which has associated w˜(α = 0) = x
2
if x
2
< A (which is always the case under
Assumption 1 (i), A ≥ x), and leads to Wα=0 = x2
4
.
(iv) α = 1
2
, which has associated w˜(α = 1
2
) =
√
1 + x− 1, if 2
¡√
1 + x− 1
¢
< A , which
is always true under Assumption 1 (i) since it is implied by A ≥ x, and yields
Wα=
1
2 = 4x ln
¡
1
2
√
x+ 1 + 1
2
¢
− 2
¡√
x+ 1− 1
¢2
.
(v) The solution satisfying the two first order conditions:
∂W
∂α =
w˜(x((1+αw˜)(1−2α)−w˜
√
α−α2(1−4α+2
√
α−α2))−w˜(1+αw˜)2(1−2α))√
α−α2(1+αw˜)2 = 0
∂W
∂w˜ =
x(4w˜α2+2
√
α−α2+1)−2w˜(1+αw˜)2(1+2
√
α−α2)
(1+αw˜)2 = 0,
which are equivalent to find (w˜, α) from the system:
x
³
(1 + αw˜) (1− 2α)− w˜
√
α− α2
³
1− 4α+ 2
√
α− α2
´´
− w˜ (1 + αw˜)2 (1− 2α) = 0
(15)
x
³
4w˜α2 + 2
√
α− α2 + 1
´
− 2w˜ (1 + αw˜)2
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´
= 0.
(16)
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The complexity of this system of equations prevents us from achieving an explicit
algebraic solution. However, a numerical solution, and its corresponding welfare
W (α∗(x), w˜∗(x)), can be easily computed for each value of x. It can also be seen
that for very low values of x, x < 1.78, there is no (α∗(x), w˜∗(x)) satisfying the
f.o.c.’s and the constraints.
Finally, to identify the solution to the problem we have to compare the diﬀerent
candidates in order to conclude whether the solution is interior or at one of the corners.
First, we compare candidates (iii) and (iv) and we find that Wα=0 > Wα=
1
2 if and only
if x > 5.988. It can also be seen that candidate (iii) with α = 0 is never a solution
since ∂W∂α
¡
α = 0, w˜ = x
2
¢
> 0 for all x. Candidate (ii) is always dominated by (iv) or (v).
Consider, finally, the comparison between candidate (iv), i.e. α = 1
2
and the interior
solution (v). For low values of x there is no interior solution and, hence, the optimum
is trivially candidate (iv), α = 1
2
and w˜ =
√
1 + x − 1. For higher values of x, let us
define ∆WLF ≡ Wα= 12 −Wα(α∗(x), w˜∗(x)). It can be shown numerically that ∆WLF
is decreasing in x. Moreover, ∆WLF = 0 if and only if x = 2, i.e., if δ = 2(1+λ)ϕ . Thus,
summarizing, for any x < 2, the solution is
¡
α = 1
2
, w˜ =
√
1 + x− 1
¢
(laissez-faire), while
for x > 2, the interior candidate (α∗(x), w˜∗(x)) provides the highest welfare.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 7.
The HA solves Program (5), for F (a) = fa.
Without loss of generality, following the same strategy as in the proof of Proposition
6, we make some manipulations on the objective function in order to work with a more
compact optimization program. After solving the integrals, forcing a common factor equal
to f
2δ2k4
, using α ≡ γ¯w ∈ [0,
1
2
] (where α = 0 corresponds to γ¯ = 0 —banning dual practice—
and α = 1
2
corresponds to γ¯ = w
2
—laissez-faire—) and, finally, defining K ≡ k2(1+λ)f , w˜ ≡ δw
and A ≡ δk2a¯, the optimization program can be rewritten as:
max
w˜,α
Wα =
∙µ
32 (αw˜ − ln (1 + αw˜)) +
w˜2

(1+2
√
α−α2)
2−16α2

(1+αw˜)
¶
−2w˜2K
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢¤
s.t. w˜ ≥ 0, w˜
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´
≤ A and α ∈
∙
0,
1
2
¸
.
This program is simpler (but equivalent) to the original one. The variable that deter-
mines the intensity of the limiting policy, α, is defined over a compact set and, moreover,
there is only one parameter that is relevant for the optimization (K) instead of four (λ,
f, δ, k) in the original program. Note that we only consider cases with f > (1 + λ) k2
(see Assumption 1 (ii)), what restricts the space of K to K ∈ (0, 1) .
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To solve this program, using Kuhn-Tucker, we have to consider the five candidates to
solution. These candidates are:
(i) w˜ = 0, in which case W = 0.
(ii) w˜ = A
(1+2
√
α−α2)
, in which case W is a function of α parametrized by A :
W = 32
³
αA
1+2
√
α−α2 − ln
³
1 + αA
1+2
√
α−α2
´´
+
+

A
1+2
√
α−α2
2

1+ αA
1+2
√
α−α2

³¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢2 − 16α2´− 2K ³ A
1+2
√
α−α2
´2 ¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢
.
It can be shown that for the two extremes in α
W (α = 0, w˜ = A;K,A) = A2 (1− 2K)
W
µ
α =
1
2
, w˜ =
A
2
;K,A
¶
= 32
µ
A
4
− ln
µ
1 +
A
4
¶¶
−KA2.
And for very low values ofK,W (α = 0, w˜ = A;K,A) is larger thanW
¡
α = 1
2
, w˜ = A
2
;K,A
¢
for all A. Notice, however, that the solution in this region might also be interior in
α. Finding analytically the maximum in α is diﬃcult, but doing it numerically we
can show that in this candidate, α(A) is decreasing in A and is strictly positive. It
can also be easily checked that the welfare for this candidate is decreasing in A.
(iii) α = 0, which has associated w˜ = A if K < 1
2
(which is a particular case of candidate
(ii)), that gives profits Wα=0 = A2 (1− 2K) ; while the optimal wage is w˜ = 0 if
K ≥ 1
2
(which is a particular case of candidate (i)) and leads to W = 0.
(iv) α = 1
2
, which has associated w˜ = 21−KK if 2
1−K
K ≤
A
2
, i.e., A ≥ 4(1−K)K , with a welfare
of
W
µ
α =
1
2
, w˜ = 2
µ
1−K
K
¶¶
= 32
µ
1
K
− 1
¶
− 32 ln
µ
1
K
¶
− 16(1−K)
2
K
,
while for A < 4(1−K)K , the optimal wage is w˜ =
A
2
(which is a particular case of
candidate (ii)) with an associated welfare of
W
µ
α =
1
2
, w˜ =
A
2
¶
= 32
µ
A
4
− ln
µ
1 +
A
4
¶¶
−KA2
(v) Finally, the candidates from the interior solution are the solution of the system formed
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by the two first order conditions of the optimization program,
∂W
∂α =
w˜2√
α−α2(1+αw˜)2
£
(1 + αw˜) 2 (1− 2α)
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢
−w˜
√
α− α2
³¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢2 − 16α2´− 2K (1− 2α) (1 + αw˜)2i
∂W
∂w˜ =
w˜
(1+αw˜)2
h
16α3w˜ +
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢2
(2 + αw˜)
−4K
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢
(1 + αw˜)2
¤
.
If there exists an α ∈
¡
0, 1
2
¢
that is a candidate to solution of the optimization
program then α∗(x) and w˜∗(x)) are such that:
(1 + αw˜) 2 (1− 2α)
¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢
− w˜
√
α− α2
³¡
1 + 2
√
α− α2
¢2 − 16α2´
−2K (1− 2α) (1 + αw˜)2 = 0
(17)
16α3w˜ +
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´2
(2 + αw˜)− 4K
³
1 + 2
√
α− α2
´
(1 + αw˜)2 = 0 (18)
It is straightforward to see that α = 1
2
is always a solution to the first order condition
∂W
∂α = 0. It can also be seen that there does not always exist an interior solution. In
particular, for K = 0 equation (18) does not hold as it is always positive. Analogously,
it can be shown numerically that for K = 1 equation (18) does not hold as it is always
negative. Thus, by continuity, we can ensure that for very high (K → 1) and very low
(K → 0) values of K there is no interior solution for both variables. For such extreme
values of K the solution will be at one of the corners. In addition, even if there exists
a solution for α ∈
£
0, 1
2
¤
, since the system formed by (17) and (18) does not depend
on A, for low levels of A, the pair (α∗(K), w˜∗(K)) satisfying the system may not fulfill
condition w˜ ≤ A
(1+2
√
α−α2)
. Again, in these cases the solution will be one at the corners of
the domain.
From the previous discussion about the candidates to solution, it is easy to conclude
that:
• For A ≤ min
n
4(1−K)
K , w˜
∗(K)
³
1 + 2
p
α∗(K)− α∗(K)2
´o
, the only candidate to
solution is candidate (ii). Hence the solution will be of this type.
• For A ≥ w˜∗(K)
³
1 + 2
p
α∗(K)− α∗(K)2
´
the interior solution (v) is also a candi-
date. The complexity of the system prevents us from fully characterizing the interior
candidate, but we can easily show that there exist intermediate values ofK for which
the system has a solution satisfying the constraints and it is the solution of the HA
problem. To prove existence it suﬃces to take, for instance K = 0.6. For this par-
ticular value the system formed by (17) and (18) yields α∗(K = 0.6) ' 0.1276
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and w˜∗(K = 0.6) ' 2.0348. Note also that for α∗(K = 0.6) ' 0.1276 and
w˜∗(K = 0.6) ' 2.0348 to satisfy w˜ ≤ A
1+2
√
α−α2 , it has to be the case that
A ≥ 3.3926. It can be easily proven that an increase in δ will translate into a
lower γ¯. To show this point, note that K is the only parameter that aﬀects α∗ and
w˜∗. This allows us to show that for the interior solution an increase in δ (which does
not aﬀect K) will not aﬀect the solution of the problem. This, in turns, implies
that w will decrease (to keep w˜∗ invariant) and hence γ¯ will decrease (to keep α∗
invariant).
To complete the proof it rests to compare the objective function evaluated at the
diﬀerent possible solutions. To have a better understanding of the solution it is useful to
use the comparison between candidate (iii), α = 0, and candidate (iv), α = 1
2
:
• If K ∈ ¡1
2
, 1
¢
then Wα=1/2 > Wα=0. In addition, we know that for K close to one
the interior candidate (v) does not exist. Hence for large values of K the solution
to the problem is either of type (iv) or of type (ii).
• If K ≤ 1
2
and A > 4(1−K)K then, whether W
α=0 = A2 (1− 2K) is higher or lower
thanWα=1/2 = 32
¡
A
4
− ln
¡
1 + A
4
¢¢
−K (A)2 depends on A. Let us denote by A˜(K)
the level of A that satisfies
A˜2 (1−K) = 32
Ã
A˜
4
− ln
Ã
1 +
A˜
4
!!
Note that A˜(K) is an increasing function of K, with A˜(K = 1
2
) = 6.4951. Then,
for A < A˜(K), it holds that Wα=1/2 > Wα=0, while for A > A˜(K), we have that
Wα=1/2 < Wα=0. The best of them has to be compared with the other candidates
to solution. As for K close to 0 there is no interior solution of type (v), if K is very
small and A is large then candidate (iii) has to be compared with candidate (ii).
• If K ≤ 1
2
and A ≤ 4(1−K)K (a decreasing function of K), then (iii) and (iv) are
particular cases of (ii) and are taken into account there. Since for K close to 0 there
is no solution of type (iv), we have that for low values of K and A the solution of
the problem is of type (ii).
Final comparisons for each combination of parameters can be done numerically.
To show that it is possible to find intermediate values of K for which an interior
candidate (v) is optimal it suﬃces to consider again K = 0.6. A direct computation
shows that, when comparing the welfare at this value with the one obtained in candidates
(ii) or (iv), Wα (α∗(K = 0.6), w˜∗(K = 0.6)) is the highest one.
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A.11 Proof of Proposition 8.
Developing countries: The proof follows from combining Propositions 2, 4 and 7.
Developed countries: To proof that for δ ≤ 2(1+λ)ϕ the best is laissez-faire and that
for δ ∈
h
2(1+λ)
ϕ ,
4(1+λ)
ϕ
i
and δ > 8(1+λ)ϕ the best policy is to impose a limit γ¯ > 0 on the
physician involvement in dual practice is direct from combining Propositions 1, 3 and 6.
Thus, it remains to show that for values of δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
a policy of limits
dominates that with exclusive contracts.
From Proposition 3 we know that for δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
the optimal exclusive contract
is given by ∆ = ϕδ−4(1+λ)
2δ(1+λ) and w
E =
t
1+ δϕ
1+λ−1
δ . Defining x ≡
δϕ
1+λ the associated HA’s
welfare is:
WE∗ ≡ WE
µ
∆ =
x− 4
2δ
, wE =
√
1 + x− 1
δ
¶
=
1 + λ
δ2k2
µ
x2
2
− 2x+ 4
√
x+ 1− 12 + 4x
³
ln
³
2
³
1 +
√
1 + x
´´
− ln (x)
´¶
Note that, as we are in the region with δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
, this function is only defined
for x ∈ [4, 8].
We compare nowWE∗ with the welfare obtained under the optimal policy for x ∈ [4, 8],
as characterized in Proposition 6, given byWα(α∗(x), w˜∗(x)) with α∗(x) and w˜∗(x) being
the solution to the system (15) and (16). For this purpose, let us define, for any value of
x, W˘ ≡ WE∗ −Wα(α∗(x), w˜∗(x)).
It can be shown numerically that ∀x ∈ [4, 8], W˘ is decreasing in x. Moreover, we find
that when x = 4, W˘ < 0. Therefore, for any x ∈ [4, 8], i.e., δ ∈
h
4(1+λ)
ϕ ,
8(1+λ)
ϕ
i
it holds
that Wα(α∗(x), w˜∗(x)) >WE∗.
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